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Abstract 
Crime levels have risen significantly in Argentina during recent years. In this study, we 
analyze the relationship between crime victimization and income distribution. Our main 
question is whether the rich or the poor have been the main victims of this crime rise. For 
home robberies, we found that the poor have suffered the main crime increases. For street 
robberies, both groups show similar augments in victimization. The findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the rich are better able to protect their houses through 
private security devices than the poor. Additional evidence supports this interpretation.  
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I. Introduction 
During the 1990s, Argentina suffered drastic increases in crime levels. Official statistics 
show that reported property crimes increased in Argentina by 93%, from 404,465 in 1990 
to 782,784 in 2001, while the number of total crimes more than doubled from 560,240 in 
1990 to 1,178,530 in 2001.1 This increase has been particularly severe in the Province of 
Buenos Aires, where crime levels tripled, and even more dramatic in the City of Buenos 
Aires, where they quintupled. Figure 1 and 2 ilustrate the evolution of the total crime and 
property crime rates per 100,000 unhabitants, for Argentina, the Province of Buenos 
Aires, and the City of Buenos Aires since 1990. 
 
 
Figure 1: Total Reported Crime
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1 Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1998) report a significant increase in crime throughout the 
world, including Latin American countries. 
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Figure 2: Reported Property Crime
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Because of victims’ tendency to underreport, these figures highly underestimate crime 
levels. According to a recent victimization survey, 41% of the surveyed people declare to 
have suffered a crime during 1999, but only 29% of those crimes were reported to the 
police (Ministerio de Justicia, 2000). In our survey, more than 30% of the people 
interviewed report that at least one member of his or her household has been robbed 
during 2001. Another recent survey (Catterberg & Asoc, 2001) shows that 23.7% of the 
interviewed people declare to have suffered a crime during the past 12 months, and 5.1% 
during the last month. The figures reach 40.4% and 13.6%, respectively, when the 
question refers to all the members of the household. Crime has become one of the main 
concerns of the population according to recent opinion polls (Clarin, April 29, 2001).2 
 
                                                 
2 In that poll, 74.6% of the surveyed people declare to be concerned about unemployment, 66.3% 
concerned about crime, and 42.9% concerned about corruption, as the three main population 
worries. Opinion polls in 17 Latin American countries describe violence as “the region’s main 
social and economic problem” (Londoño and Guerrero, 1999). 
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The increase in crime rates is a pretty well documented fact. The purpose of our study is 
to analyze which social groups have been the main victims of this significant increase in 
crime. In order to address this question empirically, we run a survey on current and past 
victimization rates and income levels. For home robberies, we found that the poor have 
suffered the main crime increases. During the first half of the decade, high-income 
households had suffered a significantly higher victimization rate than low-income 
households. The difference has now turned non-significant. For street robberies, instead, 
both groups show similar augments in victimization. 
 
Our findings are consistent with additional evidence showing that the rich are able to 
protect their houses through private security devices better than the poor. The use of 
private security devices was highly unusual in Argentina a few years ago. The use of 
private security in home protection was restricted to a small number of very high-income 
people. Private neighborhoods with gated access (barrios privados) were largely non-
existent. With low levels of private protection and a relatively even distribution of public 
police protection, criminals tended to target high-income booties. However, this reality 
changed drastically when unemployment and crime started to rise. As the likelihood of 
becoming the victim of a crime raised, high and middle-income citizens increased the 
consumption of private security devices. Many high and middle-income neighborhoods 
have now private security protection and gated access. Homes and cars are now protected 
by a variety of security devices. Our findings show that high-income groups are more 
likely than low-income groups to use hire private security guards. However, the ability to 
use protection devices against street robberies seems to be limited.  
 
If high and middle-income citizens responded to the crime increase by protecting their 
homes, low-income houses might have suffered the main burden of the crime increase, 
suggesting the presence of significant negative externalities associated with the use of 
home security devices. Without a similar ability to hire street protection devices, both 
rich and poor seem to have suffered a similar increase in street victimization rates. 
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In the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes the previous literature and its relationship to 
the empirical exercise that we conduct. Section 3 presents a model that ilustrates the 
effect of increases in victimization by social groups. Section 4 describes our survey, 
while the results are presented in Section 5. The last section discusses policy implications 
and concludes. 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
The relationship between the protection of property rights and income distribution has 
received considerable attention. However, this attention has mostly focused on analyzing 
the effect of income distribution on crime levels. In one of the first papers in the crime 
literature, Ehrlich (1973) pointed out that both theory and empirical evidence suggest a 
positive correlation between income inequality and crimes against property. Since then, 
there has been a series of papers that have dealt with this question, either directly or 
indirectly, using a variety of empirical strategies. 
 
A natural idea is to exploit cross-country variations in income inequality. Most work on 
crime, however, has been reluctant to make international comparisons. Cross-country 
studies of crime have important data problems because official crime data is often not 
comparable across countries. There are differences in underreporting and in the 
definitions of crime in different countries. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000b) is 
one of the first attempts at explaining crime patterns across countries. To solve the data 
limitations outlined above they focus on the rate of homicides (per 100,000 people) as the 
proxy for violent crimes, arguing that this type of crime suffers the least from 
underreporting and idiosyncratic classification. The authors use a sample of 45 developed 
and less developed countries for the period 1965-1995.  The main conclusion of the paper 
is that income inequality, measured by the Gini index, has a robust, significant and 
positive effect on the incidence of violent crimes. The econometric methodology is a 
GMM IV estimator that controls for unobserved country-specific effects and the possible 
endogeneity of the explanatory variable. The strong correlation between income 
inequality, measured by the Gini index, and crime survives after controlling for relative 
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poverty, ethnic polarization, unequal distribution of police protection, and access to the 
judicial system. 
 
An interesting aspect of this study is the connection between income inequality and 
economic opportunities in the fight against crime. Violent crime rates decrease when 
economic growth improves. However, the crime-reducing impact of the GDP growth rate 
is weaker when income inequality is larger. Interestingly, relative poverty does not seem 
to affect the crime rate once income inequality is included in the regression. It does, 
however, have an indirect impact. The positive effect of inequality falls as the poor 
become richer. It is also worth noting that crime exhibits a considerable degree of 
persistence measured by a large and significant coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable. 
 
Andalon-Lopez and Lopez-Calva (2001), and Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2000a) 
also analyze the relationship between crime, income inequality, and polarization. Raphael 
and Winter-Ebmer (2001) summarize the results of 68 studies on unemployment and 
crime. The literature finds a strong positive relationship between the unemployment rate 
and, on the one hand, income inequality (e.g. Blinder and Esaki (1978)) and, on the other, 
crime rates (Ehrlich (1973), Freeman (1991), Tauchen, Witte and Griesinger (1994), inter 
alia -but also see Papps and Winkelman (1996)-).  
 
A shorter literature, however, has analyzed the different question of who are the main 
victims of crime. From the basic model of crime of Becker (1968), one would expect that 
the rich are more attractive targets for the poor.3 On the other hand, if the rich can protect 
themselves so as to avoid victimization it is possible that any increase in crime falls on 
the disadvantaged. Levitt (1999) argues that the poor suffer disproportionately more from 
property crime today than what they did twenty years ago, possibly because of the 
                                                 
3 Becker’s work started an enormous literature in economics that uses that rational choice 
paradigm (see Witte (1980), McCormick and Tollison (1984), Ehrlich and Brower (1987), 
Andreoni (1991), Freeman (1996), Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996), Levitt (1997), 
inter alia).  
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increased reliance on theft-prevention devices by higher income groups. He also indicates 
that, in stark contrast to property crime, homicide appears to have become more dispersed 
across income groups, at least based on neighborhood-level data for Chicago. Moreover, 
the political economy of crime protection suggests that more intense public police 
deterrence will occur in rich neighborhoods. Income distribution may affect public 
provision as richer households may be able to supplement votes with campaign 
contributions.  
 
An important class of papers in this topic involves so-called crime victimization studies. 
Gaviria and Pages (2002) provide an example of such a study for Latin America. They 
show that property crime in Latin America affects mostly rich and middle class 
households living in larger cities. They also find that households living in cities with 
rapid population growth are more likely to be victimized than households living in cities 
with stable population. The main data set used is the Latinobarometer. This is a public 
opinion survey restricted to urban populations that covers 17 Latin American countries 
and more than 50,000 households between 1996 and 1998. The key survey question used 
in this paper is “Have you or any member of your family been assaulted, robbed or 
victimized in any way during the past twelve months?” Demographic characteristics of 
the respondent and the head of the household contained in the Latinobarometer are used 
in the analysis as control variables. The authors assume that all the reported victimization 
rates correspond to property crime. They construct an index of long-term economic status 
with data about the ownership of appliances and durable goods and housing 
characteristics that the survey contains (because household income or wealth is missing 
from this data set). Victimization surveys from Colombia, El Salvador and Peru are also 
used to complement the analysis and give a deaggregated picture of type of crime in 
those countries. Gaviria and Velez (2001) perform a similar study for Colombia. These 
studies do not analyze chages in victimization distribution under fluctuations in crime 
levels. 
 
An important issue on victimization differences across social groups is that income levels 
affect households’ ability to protect themselves against crime. Garcette (2001) presents a 
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model to study how crime victimization is distributed across the poor and the rich. The 
main result of the paper is that crime victimization inequality increases in the income of 
the pivotal voter who sets the level of public protection expenditures. Empirical studies 
have to recognize that private security devices may reduce the level of crime in some 
areas, but displaced it to other areas. Thus, observable private security may induce 
negative externalities into neighboring areas.4 Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) show 
the highly local deterrent effect of standing guard policemen. The complementary set of 
questions is asked by Ayres and Levitt (1998), Lott (1998), and Duggan (2001). These 
papers study the effect of the introduction of unobservable protection devices (Lojack and 
concealed handguns) with potentially positive externalities. These market failures may 
generate suboptimal provision of private security by the free market. 
 
 
3. A Simple Model 
Our hypothesis is that, as the crime increase led high-income citizens to protect 
themselves through private security devices, low-income households suffered the main 
burden of the increase in victimization. We illustrate these ideas using a model built on 
the traditional vertical differentiation model (see Tirole 1989). In our model potential 
criminals have the opportunity of being honest or committing one criminal act. If the 
potential thieves decide to be honest, they take home with certainty the salary w obtained 
in legal activities. Instead, if criminal i attacks victim j, his utility level is given by: 
 
jjiij sbu −=α  
  
where: iα  is a preference parameter uniformly distributed in the population of potential 
criminals between 0 and 1; b  is the booty obtained from potential victim j; and  is the 
desutility generated by the level of protection hired by potential victim j. There are two 
types of potential victims: rich (R) and poor (P). We assume that b , i.e., rich 
j js
PR b>
                                                 
4 For a survey of the criminology literature on displacement the reader is referred to Cornish and 
Clarke (1987) and Hesseling (1994). 
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victims have more valuable booties. We also assume that the poor cannot hire private 
security (perhaps, because of its high cost), while the rich can hire the private security 
that induces disutility  at a fixed cost c.js
5 Unrealistically, we treat here the decision to 
install a private security device as a unified decision by the rich community with an 
individual cost c.6 This leaves all the risk-neutral, identical, rich agents with two options. 
If they do not hire private security, their individual net wealth levels are given by: 
αˆ
 
( ) RsRs bPWR 00 == −= , 
 
where W is the gross wealth and 
0=sRP  is the probability of the rich being attacked under 
no private security. Alternatively, rich agents can hire private security receiving net 
wealth: 
( ) cbPWR RsRs −−= == 11  
 
As a benchmark, let’s start solving the model assuming that private security is not 
available. In this case, every potential criminal that decides to commit a crime will prefer 
to attack a rich household because . This leaves potential criminals with only two 
options: being honest or attacking the rich. There will be a potential criminal with 
preference parameter 
PR bb >
 (such that Rbw αˆ= ) that is indifferent between these two 
options. All the potential criminals with αα ˆ>i  will attack a rich household, while the 
rest will work in honest activities. Normalizing M, the total population of rich, and N, the 
total population of potential criminals, to 1, the probability for the rich agents of suffering 
an attack is given by: 
 
                                                 
5 In reality, private security protection can also be hired in low-income neighborhoods. We are 
simply assuming here that the fixed cost c is high enough as to being unaffordable for the low-
income households or that the value of the expected loss in the poor neighborhood is lower than 
the security costs. The argument just needs that private protection is a normal good. Note that, in 
practice, the hiring of private security always involves fixed costs. 
6 This is just a simplification to isolate our argument from problems of collective decisionmaking. 
Of course, negative externalities within the rich neighborhoods could also be present. 
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As expected, crime levels are lower when the salary w that potential criminals can 
obtained from legal activities is higher. As long as , there will be some positive 
level of crime. Note that, as w decreases, the marginal criminal that switches to illegal 
activities has a lower preference parameter α. As said before, under no security all the 
crime is suffered by the rich. 
wbR >
 
Let’s incorporate now the possibility that rich households hire private protection. In this 
case, all the identical rich households have two options. If they do not hire private 
protection, their net wealth level is given by: 
 
( ) R
R
RsRs
b
b
wWbPWR 


 −−=−= == 100  
 
Instead, if the rich hire private protection, the potential criminals now have three options: 
being honest, attacking the poor, or attacking the rich. There will be a potential criminal 
with preference parameter α(  (such that Pbw α(= ) who is indifferent between being 
honest or attacking the poor; and a potential criminal with preference parameter α~  (such 
that PR bsb αα ~~ =− , i.e., )
~
PR bb
s
−α (= ) who is indifferent between attacking the rich or 
the poor. Thus, all the potential criminals with αα ~>i  will attack a rich household, the 
ones with ααα ~>> i(  will attack a poor household, while the rest will work in honest 
activities. Now the probability for the rich agents of suffering an attack is given by: 
 




−−== PRsR bb
sP 1
1
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which gives net wealth levels: 
( ) cb
bb
sWcbPWR R
PR
RsRs
−



−−−=−−= == 111  
 
Thus, the rich decide to hire private security when: 
 
wc
bb
sbb
b
wWcb
bb
sWRR
PR
R
R
R
R
PR
ss
>−−⇔


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
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Thus, when the salary w that potential criminals can obtained from legal activities is high, 
c
bb
sbw
PR
R −−≥ )( , the rich do not protect themselves and they are the only targets of 
criminal activity. In this case, 


 −==
R
sR b
wP 1
0
 and 0
0
==sPP . Instead, for 
c
bb
sbw
PR
R −−< )( , the rich decide to hire private security. In this case, the level of crime 
suffered by the rich is fixed at 



−−== PRsR bb
sP 1
1
, while the poor suffer 



 −−== PPRsP b
w
bb
sP
1
. 
 
Simple comparative statics of this model for changes in w provide predictions that we 
will then analyze using our data on the evolution of crime in Argentina during the 1990s. 
At a high salary w obtained from legal activities (a low unemployment rate), crime was 
low. Initial reductions in w only imply higher crime victimization rates for the rich. If w 
keeps falling (if unemployment keeps increasing), however, there is a point at which the 
rich hire private protection. After that point, subsequent unemployment increases only 
increase crime levels suffered by the poor. Crime rises as a result of the increase in 
unemployment, but it concentrates in poor neighborhoods as high-income neighborhoods 
hire private security devices that induced negative externalities over poor neighborhoods. 
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In summary, the model has three predictions. First, the use of private security devices 
increases with the number of criminals. Second, the consumption of private security 
devices reduces crime victimization levels of the consumers. Third, the main burden of 
crime increases is suffered by the poor. 
 
 
IV. Data Description 
A household survey specially designed is the main source of information for this study. 
The target population of the study is the population of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan 
Area. We surveyed 200 households in the City of Buenos Aires and 200 households in 
the suburban Great Buenos Aires through telephone interviews. In addition, we 
performed 100 street interviews to people that declared not to have a home telephone 
line. The survey collected information on victimization events, crime reporting, 
behavioral responses to crime, consumption of private protection, and income and 
demographic household information.7 
 
Although the survey is cross-sectional, we asked households to report retrospective 
information for the entire decade. However, retrospective information is always subject 
to recall bias. Thus, we designed the survey exploiting several techniques specially 
developed to minimize this nuisance. First, we restricted the information set to major 
crime events: armed robberies and forcible entry into their homes. The restriction to 
major events significantly reduces typical recall bias of retrospection, which is mainly 
associated to microscopic events (see Aday, 1996, and Reuband, 1994). Moreover, for 
our main results we just concentrate on whether the household has been victim of a crime 
during a period of time, but not on the number of times this has occurred. We should 
expect that recall bias has a larger effect on the latter, than on the former. Additionally, 
we used bounded recall procedures to reduce underreporting of crime events as a result of 
telescoping events from past periods. Although this procedure was designed for panel 
surveys, Sudman, Finn and Lannom (1984) consider its use for a cross-sectional survey. 
                                                 
7 See Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky (2002) for the exact version of our survey and the 
detailed household responses. 
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Subsequent research has confirmed that asking people twice about the same events, first 
in connection with a given reference period and then in connection with the period of 
interest, is very effective in reducing underreporting or, in general, recall bias (Aday, 
1996). More importantly, our main question is which group has been mostly affected by 
the increase in crime levels. As this question refers to the changes in victimization rates 
rather than the levels, it will not be affected if recall bias affects both groups (rich and 
poor) similarly. 
 
When we asked households retrospective information, we preferred to sacrify precision in 
the exact year of an event, but win confidence by considering longer time periods. Thus, 
we defined three periods: 1990-1994 (the first part of the decade with low unemployment 
and strong growth), 1995-2000 (the period after the Tequila crisis with significant 
unemployment and a declining economy), and the final year of 2001 (right before the 
default of the external debt, the end of Convertibility, and the current unemployment 
peak). 
 
A first look at the results in Table 1 shows that 10.2% of the households interviewed in 
our survey suffered a home robbery (forcible entry into their house) during 2001. This 
percentage was the same for the whole period 1995-2000, and 7.9% for 1990-1994. 
43.1% of these crimes were reported to the police in 2001, but the figure was larger in the 
previous years (45.1% for 1995-2000, and 74.4% for 1990-1994). For robberies outside 
the home, 36.8% of the interviews show that at least one member of the household has 
been robbed during 2001. This percentage was 27.5% for 1995-2000, and 10.0% for 
1990-1994. The reporting rate of this type of crime tends to be lower than for home 
robberies, but similarly decreasing over time (36.8% for 2001, 46.7% for 1995-2000, and 
51.1% for 1990-1994). 
Table 1 
 Home Robbery Street Robbery 
 %Victimization %Reporting %Victimization %Reporting 
1990-1994 7.9 74.4 10.0 51.1 
1995-2000 10.2 45.1 27.5 46.7 
2001 10.2 43.1 34.6 36.8 
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These figures suggest that there was a significant increase in victimization rates 
(remember that the question refers to periods of different length), and a decrease in 
reporting rates. Consistently, Table 2 shows a growing feeling of insecurity in the 
population. 
 
Table 2 
Perceived Insecurity % 
In your neighborhood, would you say that insecurity 
with respect to one decade ago has increased a lot, 
some, a little, has not changed at all, or has decreased? 
 
 Increased a lot 38.8 
 Increased some 30.0 
 Increased a little 11.6 
 No change 18.8 
 Decreased 0.8 
 
A final data issue is that the measure of income levels through surveys is always a 
delicate matter. Many people decline to reveal their income in a survey. When they 
answer, it is well known that the rich tend to underreport their income, while the poor 
may overdeclare. The best strategy to address this problem is to ask questions on 
education level, ocupation, and availability of cars, appliances (PC, air conditioner, and 
authomatic washing machine), and credit cards, in order to infer income levels from these 
variables. In the absence of income data, the opinion poll company, following the 
methodology developed by Asociación Argentina de Marketing (1998), provided us with 
an index of income level that collapses all the indicators of household education, 
ocupation, and wealth into a continuous variable. Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky 
(2002) show the details of this methodology. Using this index, we now proceed to answer 
our research questions. 
 
 
V. Empirical Results 
V.1. The Evolution of Crime Victimization by Income Group 
Our main question is which social group has been most affected by the significant 
increase in crime suffered in Argentina during the 1990s. Thus, we want to compare the 
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change in crime levels for the high-income group relative to the change in crime levels 
for the low-income group. We took the median of the income level index to classify the 
households in the high and low-income level category. Note that this comparison will not 
be affected by recall bias as long as this bias is uncorrelated with income levels.8 
 
To analyze which social group has been most affected by the crime increase, Figure 3 
starts by illustrating the differential evolution of victimization rates for home robberies 
across income groups: 
 
Figure 3: Home Robberies
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8 In the first part of the survey we asked the number of times a member of the household had been 
robbed during the period 1990-94. To control for the consistency of the responses, at the very end 
of the questionnaire we asked the number of times a member of the household had been robbed 
during 1990-92, and during 1993-94. 92% of the interviewed people responded consistently (i.e., 
the sum of the responses to these two final questions equaled the previous response for the whole 
period). The correlation between our income level index and this consistency measure is very low 
(-0.12). 
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Table 3 compares these figures to obtain a difference-in-differences estimator of the 
variation in home robberies by income levels. For the period 1990-1994, high-income 
households suffered a significantly higher home victimization rate than low-income 
families. After that period, low-income households suffered a significant increase in 
victimization likelihood, while high-income families show a non-significant decline. The 
cross-sectional difference becomes insignificant in those subsequent periods. Thus, the 
victimization rate of the low-income households caught up to the high-income rate during 
the decade. Importantly, the difference-in-differences tests show that the change in the 
victimization rate of the low-income group is significantly different from the change for 
the high-income households. 
 
Table 3 
[2001]-[95-00] [95-00]-[90-94] [2001]-[90-94] Home Robbery 90-94 95-00 2001 
Diff se Diff se Diff se 
High 0.11 0.10 0.09 -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
Low 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.02 (0.03) 0.06** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
Diff 0.06*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.03  -0.07*  -0.10***  High-Low 
se (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 
Figure 4 pictures the evolution of victimization rates for street robberies across income 
groups: 
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Figure 4: Street Robberies
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The difference-in-differences analysis for robberies suffered by household members 
outside the house is performed in Table 4. For the three periods, high-income households 
suffered a higher victimization rate than low-income families. The cross-sectional 
difference seems significant for the three periods. Moreover, both groups have suffered a 
significant increase in crime levels. The difference-in-differences tests, however, are 
never significant, suggesting that the evolution of victimization rates has not differed 
across groups. 
 
Table 4 
[2001]-[95-00] [95-00]-[90-94] [2001]-[90-94] Street Robbery 90-94 95-00 2001 
Diff se Diff se Diff Se 
High 0.12 0.33 0.38 0.05** (0.04) 0.20*** (0.04) 0.26*** (0.04) 
Low 0.08 0.22 0.31 0.09 (0.04) 0.14*** (0.03) 0.23*** (0.03) 
Diff 0.05* 0.11*** 0.08* -0.04  0.06  0.03  High-Low 
se (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
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 We now want to explore whether the difference-in-differences results from Tables 3 and 
4 are robust to the inclusion of pertinent control variables. We want to analyze the change 
in the likelihood of suffering a crime for different social groups after controlling for 
personal characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, and type of home (apartment or 
house). We also include random-effects to control for potential correlation in the 
victimization suffered by the same family over time. To identify which social group has 
been most affected by the crime increase, we first estimate the following Logit model:  
 
+++== −−−− 20012001,2000199520001995,941990941990,it ()1Prob(z IHIHIHF iHiHiH ααα  
)xit20012001,2000199520001995,941990941990, iiiLiLiL ILILIL µλβααα ++++++ −−−−  
 
where zit=1 if household i has been victimized during period t, Hi and Li are dummy 
variables indicating whether the family belongs to the high or low income group, I1990-94 
I1994-2000, and I2001 are dummy variables for each period, xit is a vector of household 
covariates (that may or may not vary over time), λi is a neighborhood fixed effect, and µi 
is a household random effect. We are not interested in the α’s, which capture the level of 
the victimization likelihood for each group in each period. The focus of our analysis are 
neither the differences )( 2,1, TATA αα − , that capture the change for one group between 
two different periods T1 and T2, nor )( 1,1, TBTA αα − , that captures the cross-sectional 
difference between both groups at the same period. Instead, we want to test the null 
hypothesis of similar change for both groups. Defining 2,1,21, TATATTA αα −=∆ − , we test 
whether . 21, TT −21, LTTH − ∆=∆
 
Table 5 presents this difference-in-differences estimates for the home robberies. In 
column A, our estimates are obtained from a pooled Logit where the only control is 
whether the household lives in a building apartment or in a house. The next column 
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incorporates household random effects in a panel Logit regression.9 The characteristics of 
the household head (education level, gender, age, and age squared) are incorporated in 
column C, while neighborhood dummies are added in the last column. The results are 
extremely similar for the four specifications. The increase in crime victimization for the 
low-income group is higher than the change experienced by the high-income group. The 
difference is significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 5 
Dependent Variable: 
Home Robbery 
Dummy 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
H95 -0.47** -0.60 -0.61 -0.61 
 (2.00) (1.52) (1.53) (1.52) 
H01 -0.56 -0.62 -0.63 -0.63 
 (1.47) (1.57) (1.58) (1.57) 
L90 -0.59 -1.18*** -0.91* -0.92* 
 (1.52) (2.88) (1.81) (1.83) 
L95 -1.13*** -0.15 0.13 0.12 
 (2.90) (0.44) (0.30) (0.27) 
L01 -0.13 -0.01 0.26 0.25 
 (0.43) (0.04) (0.60) (0.58) 
Constant -0.01 -1.98*** -0.67 -0.41 
 (0.03) (6.64) (0.33) (0.20) 
     
χ2 Null Hypothesis:     
∆H,95-90 = ∆L,95-90 8.67*** 8.97*** 9.05*** 9.05*** 
∆H,01-90 = ∆L,01-90 10.44*** 10.79*** 10.87*** 10.86*** 
∆H,01-95 = ∆L,01-95 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
     
Individual Controls No No Yes Yes 
Zone Controls No No No Yes 
Random Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1195 1193 1193 1193 
Note: Weighted Logit model. All the regressions include a Building Apartment dummy. Absolute 
value of z-statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 
In Table 6, we perform the same exercise for the robberies suffered by the household 
members outside the home. Again, we run four different specifications. We never find 
significant differences in the changes in crime victimization suffered by low and high 
                                                 
9 Note that the whole set of α’s cannot be identified in a fixed effects regression. 
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income households. These results suggest that the evolution of crime victimization does 
not differ across groups for street robberies. 
 
Table 6 
Dependent Variable: 
Street Robbery Dummy (A) (B) (C) (D) 
H95 1.41*** 1.52*** 1.52*** 1.52*** 
 (4.47) (4.56) (4.56) (4.56) 
H01 1.62*** 1.76*** 1.75*** 1.75*** 
 (5.17) (5.28) (5.29) (5.28) 
L90 -0.39 -0.42 0.05 0.01 
 (1.06) (1.10) (0.12) (0.03) 
L95 0.91*** 0.96*** 1.45*** 1.41*** 
 (2.96) (2.89) (3.75) (3.65) 
L01 1.26*** 1.35*** 1.84*** 1.80*** 
 (4.16) (4.10) (4.78) (4.68) 
Constant -2.14*** -2.35*** -7.07*** -7.41*** 
 (8.01) (7.89) (4.00) (4.18) 
     
χ2 Null Hypothesis:     
∆H,95-90-∆L,95-90 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 
∆H,01-90-∆L,01-90 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
∆H,01-95-∆L,01-95 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 
     
Individual Controls No No Yes Yes 
Zone Controls No No No Yes 
Random Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1182 1181 1181 1181 
Note: Weighted Logit model. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
In these two tables, we have consider the dependent variable as a binary indicator that 
takes the value of 1 when household i has suffered a crime in period t, and 0 otherwise. 
This binary definition has the advantage of minimizing recall biases (it is easier to 
remember whether a household has suffered a robbery, rather than the exact number of 
times it has happened), but at the cost of losing information by treating similarly at 
households that have suffered a different number of crimes. As a robustness checks, we 
now reproduce our exercise in a linear random-effects regression. In this specification, 
we also correct for the different duration of the time periods by defining the dependent 
variable qit as the average number of robberies per year that household i has suffered 
during period t: 
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 +++= −−−− 20012001,2000199520001995,941990941990,itq IHIHIH iHiHiH ααα  
itiiiLiLiL ILILIL νµλβααα +++++++ −−−− it20012001,2000199520001995,941990941990, x  
 
where νit is the error term. Again, we are interested in testing the null hypothesis of 
similar change for both groups between two periods: 21,21, TTLTTH −− ∆=∆ . 
 
Table 7 presents these difference-in-differences estimates for the changes in the number 
of home robberies under different specifications. In the three cases, we find that the 
increase in crime victimization of the low-income group is higher than the change 
experienced by the high-income group. The difference is statistically significant at levels 
below 5% level. The only difference with the previous result is that, after correcting for 
the different period duration by taking the yearly average number of robberies, the 
difference-in-differences estimates are now significant for the changes from 2001 with 
respect to the other two periods, while in Table 5 the change became significant from 
2001 and 1995-2000 relative to the first period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20
Table 7 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of Home 
Robberies 
(A) (B) (C) 
H95 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
H01 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.65) (0.64) (0.64) 
L90 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 
 (0.24) (0.65) (0.84) 
L95 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 
 (0.01) (0.45) (0.64) 
L01 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.27** 
 (3.84) (2.66) (2.49) 
Constant 0.02 0.17 0.05 
 (0.25) (0.38) (0.11) 
    
χ2 Null Hypothesis:    
∆H,95-90 = ∆L,95-90 0.12 0.12 0.13 
∆H,01-90 = ∆L,01-90 5.72** 5.72** 5.87** 
∆H,01-95 = ∆L,01-95 4.16** 4.17** 4.26** 
    
Individual Controls No Yes Yes 
Zone Controls No No Yes 
Observations 1192 1192 1192 
Note: Weighted random effects model. All the regressions include a Building Apartment dummy. 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
In Table 8, we perform the same exercise for the number of robberies suffered by the 
household members outside the home. As it happened previously with our binary 
dependent variable specification, we find no significant differences in the changes in 
street robberies suffered by low and high-income households. 
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Table 8 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of Street 
Robberies 
(A) (B) (C) 
H95 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) 
H01 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 
 (8.29) (8.30) (8.22) 
L90 -0.04 0.02 0.01 
 (0.49) (0.21) (0.14) 
L95 0.05 0.10 0.10 
 (0.68) (1.18) (1.12) 
L01 0.46*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 
 (6.45) (5.86) (5.83) 
Constant 0.06 -0.31 -0.37 
 (1.08) (0.88) (1.06) 
    
χ2 Null Hypothesis    
∆H,95-90-∆L,95-90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
∆H,01-90-∆L,01-90 1.95 1.93 1.90 
∆H,01-95-∆L,01-95 2.14 2.15 2.11 
    
Individual Controls No Yes Yes 
Zone Controls No No Yes 
Observations 1181 1181 1181 
Note: Weighted random effects model. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * Significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
V.2. The Use of Security Protection Devices 
Our previous results show that the poor have suffered the main burden of the increase in 
home robberies; while both groups have suffered similar increases in victimization 
outside the house. These findings could be consistent with differences in the ability that 
people have to protect themselves against different types of crimes. We asked in our 
survey on the use of private security. Almost 20% of the households in our survey 
currently hire private security guards. We investigate the differential use of security 
devices by income level by running the following cross-sectional Logit model:  
 
)x()1Prob(sd ii iiL LF λβα ++==  
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where sdi=1 if household i utilizes private security, Li is a dummy variables indicating 
whether the family belongs to the low-income group, xi is a vector of household 
covariates, and λi is a neighborhood fixed effect. The significance of the coefficient Lα  
will tell us whether low-income households show a different likelihood than high-income 
households to hire private security. At no surprise, Table 9 shows that high-income 
households are more likely to use private security than low-income families. 
 
Table 9 
Security Dependent 
Variable: (A) (B) 
Low Income -0.79 *** -0.69 ***
 (0.26) (0.29) 
   
Individual and 
Zone Controls No Yes 
Observations 493 504 
Note: Regressions include a Building Apartment dummy. The constant is not reported. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Perhaps, there is little that people can do to avoid becoming the victim of a robbery 
outside their houses.10 More than 60% of the interviewed people declare to avoid being 
outside at night, and 40% have changed their itineraries or transportation means. 
Moreover, around 40% avoid carrying documents, credit cards, or jewelry in order to 
prevent the losses. However, according to our interviews there is not much else that 
people can do to avoid street robberies.11 Moreover, the superiority of high-income 
families to protect themselves against this type of crime seems weaker. In Table 10 we 
find that rich groups avoid carrying valuable objects. Low-income families are somewhat 
more likely to avoid dark areas, but a similar pattern is not observed for changes in 
itineraries or transportation means. 
 
                                                 
10 Of the 127 households that declare that one of its members has been robbed outside the house 
during 2001, those robberies took place in the street (92), in a car or public transportation (19), at 
work (3), in a shop or restaurant (11), or at a bank or ATM (2). 
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Table 10 
No Documents No Jewel Dependent 
Variable:  (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Low Income -0.52** -0.40* -0.54** -0.46** 
 (2.40) (1.69) (2.56) (2.00) 
     
Individual and 
Zone Controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 399 399 395 395 
 
Table 10 (cont.) 
Darkness Places Dependent 
Variable: (E) (F) (G) (H) 
Low Income 0.28 0.44* -0.22 -0.04 
 (1.33) (1.85) (1.04) (0.15) 
     
Individual and 
Zone Controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 396 396 397 397 
Notes: Weighted Logit model. The constant is not reported. Absolute value of z-statistics in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Thus, there seem to be strong differences in the use of home private protection by 
different social groups, while cross-sectional differences in street protection devices 
appear weaker. It is important to note the high observability of home protection devices 
used by the households in our sample. It is expected that the use of observable devices by 
a household leads criminals to target another property, inducing negative externalities. 
Instead, the diffusion of unobservable security devices may generate positive externalities 
by increasing the expected probability for a criminal of getting caught when facing any 
target. This is the focus of a significant literature in economics and criminology (recent 
papers include Ayres and Levitt (1998) who focus on unobservable anti-theft devices 
produced by the Lojack company, and Lott and Mustard (1997) and Duggan (2001) who 
focus on the right-to-carry concealed handguns laws).  Thus, we not only find that rich-
households are more likely to use private security, but the observable nature of these 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Very rich people can, of course, resort to bodyguards and armored cars, but these is extremely 
expensive and infrequent in Argentina. 
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devices suggest that they may shift crime from the areas that have observable protection 
to those that do not or, in our set-up, from rich to poor areas. 
 
 
V.3. The Effect of Private Security on Crime  
In this section we estimate the causal effect of having private security on the probability 
of becoming the victim of a crime. The identification of the causal effect of private 
security on home robbery requires attention to the possible endogeneity of private 
security. It may be the case that those households that demand private security are more 
likely to be assaulted at home for reasons that are unobservable to us. If these 
unobservable factors are time-invariant, then a fixed effect model would identified the 
desired causal effect. However, if they are time-varying, then a instrument variable that 
affects outcome solely through its impact on the binary private security regressor is 
required. Even if this instrument is time invariant, relying on the cross section dimension 
of the data set identifies the parameter of interest.   
 
Omitting any time dimension of the structure of the data, following Angrist (1999), the 
simplest option to estimate the causal effect of private security on crime is by using a 
linear, constant-effects model to describe the relationship of interest:  
 
E[Yoi] = Xi’ β 
 
and 
 
Yi1 = Yoi + α 
 
where Y is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the household was assaulted at 
home during the period considered, the subindex 0 indicates that the household does not 
posses private security while 1 indicates that the household posses it, and X is a vector of 
control variables. Let D be a zero-one indicator of private security. These assumptions 
lead a linear causal model,  
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 Yi = Xi’β + α Di + εi, 
 
that is easily estimated by 2SLS. A recurrent issue that arises in this setting is that, 
because D is binary, a nonlinear first-stage such as probit or logit may seem appropriate 
for 2SLS estimation. But the resulting second-stage estimates are inconsistent, unless the 
model for the first-stage conditional expectation function is actually correct. On the other 
hand, conventional 2SLS using a linear probability model are consistent whether or not 
the first-stage conditional expectation function is linear. Thus, it is safer to rely on a 
linear first-stage. 
 In column (A) of table 11 we report the effect of private protection on home 
robbery estimated using the cross-section data for 2001 considering private security in the 
two previous periods as our instruments. The F-test shows that these instruments are not 
weak. In column (B), we exploit the panel dimension and attempt to identify the 
parameter of interest by exploiting the within group variability existent in the data. 
Unfortunately, most variability occurs between periods 1 and 2 and hence we cannot use 
lagged values of private security to instrument the current level of this variable. Thus, this 
strategy relies on assuming that, once we control for household fixed effect, private 
security is not correlated with the unobserved time-varying component of home robbery. 
In column (C) we replicate the exercise by estimating a Probit model with an endogenous 
instrumented variable as suggested in Newey (1987). The instruments are the same used 
in column 1. Finally, in column (D) we replicate the exercise by estimating a Logit fixed 
effect model.  
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Table 11: The impact of private security on home robbery 
Dependent Variable: Home Robbery 
Independent 
Variables 
2SLS LSDV IV Probit Logit Fixed 
Effects 
Private Security - 0.071 * 
(0.041) 
-0.123 *** 
(0.048) 
-0.552 * 
(0.311) 
-1.434 *** 
(0.574) 
     
Period Effects ----- Yes ----- Yes 
Individual and Zone 
Effects 
Yes ----- Yes ----- 
First Stage F-Test F(2,469) = 
1618 
----- ----- ----- 
N of Observations 492 1472 487 360 
 
 
In Table 12 we explore indirectly the issue of endogeneity of private security. Suppose 
that the households that demand private security are those who are more concerned with 
being assaulted or those who are more prone to being assaulted, as a result of individual 
characteristics or because of unobservable neighborhood effects –defined narrowly as not 
being captured by the zone control effects included in all regressions- then it would be 
the case that private security would be correlated with street robbery. Table 12 shows that 
this is not the case. 
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Table 12: The impact of private security on street robbery 
Dependent Variable: Street Robbery 
Independent 
Variables 
2SLS LSDV IV Probit Logit Fixed 
Effects 
Private Security - 0.004 
(0.063) 
-0.014 
(0.068) 
0.013 
(0.188) 
-0.271 
(0.521) 
     
Period Effects ----- Yes ----- Yes 
Individual and zone 
control 
Yes ----- Yes ----- 
N of Observations 493 1457 493 712 
 
 
V.4. Access to Justice and Public Police Protection 
If private provision is relevant for crime protection, income inequality may explain why 
poor people are underprotected against crime. The poor may lack resources to hire and 
buy protection devices (Anderson, 1999). Without resources to “buy” security, poverty 
leads to underprotection. However, we may fear that some additional factors worsen the 
situation. Poor citizens may suffer a weak definition of their property rights. Without 
legal proof of their property rights (or without proper personal identification 
documents),12 the poor cannot resort to the police and the judiciary. In addition, public 
officials might have biases against the poor in the provision of their services (World 
Bank, 2000). In addition, the complexity of the legal system, educational handicaps, and 
the costs associated with judiciary processes (court fees, legal aid, time and transportation 
costs) may act as exclusionary barriers to the access to justice by the poor (World Bank, 
2000). Furthermore, if the consumption of private protection by the rich induces negative 
externalities, it should be optimal that public police forces follow crime by moving to 
low-income areas. We also exploit our survey to analyze whether there are differences in 
the treatment and protection that the poor receive from the police relative to the rich.  
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 Table 13 presents the survey responses on public police protection. We ask at which 
frequency police walks or drives in front of people’s houses. At first glance, police 
protection in high-income areas seems to be slightly better. 
 
Table 13 
  Income Level
  Low High
Total 
Total number of households 196 204 400 
How often does the police usually patrol 
your house?    
 Every day 91 103 194 
 Twice or three times a week 22 23 45 
 Once a week 13 8 21 
 At least once a month 12 9 21 
 Less than once a month 3 7 10 
 Never 30 27 57 
 No answer 25 27 52 
 
We then perform an Ordered Logit of this frequency on income levels in Table 14. With 
no controls in Column A and with household controls in Column B, police protection 
seems to be similar across social groups. However, we can still wonder whether this is 
optimal. If high-income groups protect themselves through the hiring of private security 
guards, it might be socially optimal that police forces follow crime moving to low-
income areas. This does not seem to be the case. In the last column of the table we 
include the use of private security as a control in order to analyze whether private 
protection reduces the frequency of public police protection. The security variable results 
insignificant. It does not seem to be the case that public police is being redeployed to 
compensate for negative externalities generated by private security. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 This problem may be particularly relevant for illegal immigrants. For example, Bolivian 
workers are frequent targets of robberies in Northern Great Buenos Aires (La Nacion, June 24, 
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Table 14 
Dependent Variable: 
Frequency of police 
patrolling 
(A) (B) (C) 
Low Income 0.26 0.01 0.03 
 (1.23) (0.05) (0.12) 
Private Security   -0.04 
   (0.14) 
    
Individual and Zone 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Observations 359 359 359 
Note: Weighted Ordered Logit model. The constant is not reported. Absolute value of z-statistics 
in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
VI. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
Crime has risen significantly in Argentina during recent years, together with 
unemployment and the deterioration of social conditions. We analyze which social 
groups have been the main victims of this increase in crime. For home robberies, we 
found that the poor have suffered the main crime increases. During the first half of the 
decade, high-income households used to suffer a significantly higher home victimization 
rate than low-income households. The difference has now turned non-significant. For 
street robberies, instead, both groups show similar augments in victimization. Our 
findings are consistent with additional evidence showing that the rich have been able to 
protect their houses through pecuniary security devices better than the poor. Instead, the 
ability to use protection devices against street robberies seems limited. 
 
Our results on the distributional effect of the use of private security devices may have 
important implications for the design of public protection policy. First, if high-income 
neighborhoods hire crime protection devices to protect themselves, it would be optimal 
that police forces follow crime moving to low-income areas. Our evidence on police 
patrolling does not suggest that a compensatory redeployment of public protection has 
been taking place. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2000). 
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 Second, if there are significant negative externalities associated with the use of private 
security devices, some form of taxation or regulation of the crime protection industry 
may be necessary. Ayres and Levitt (1998) show the economic importance of private 
security expenditures in the US and how such private spending has outgrown public 
spending over the recent past. This is also true in many developing countries, including 
Argentina. The sector is largely unregulated, particularly outside the US. In most 
countries that we know of, citizens are free to hire visible private protection. If such 
activities induce negative externalities, these market failures may generate an 
overprovision of private security by the free market. 
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